

Message Text

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EXDIS, TOSEC 1023

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, FR, OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)

SUBJECT:POSSIBLE PARIS STOP BRIEFING MATERIAL

FOR S/S ONLY (CONTINGENCY PAPER)

1. SETTING: THE ELECTION OF VALERY GISCARD D'ESTAING REPRESENTS A NEW PHASE IN THE FIFTH REPUBLIC AND A SIGNIFICANT EROSION OF GAULLIST INFLUENCE. WITH HIS ELECTION WE ANTICIPATE A LESS QUARRELSOME AND PERHAPS MORE CONSTRUCTIVE TONE IN US-FRENCH RELATIONS. WHILE WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT SIGNIFICANT SUBSTANTIVE CHANGES IN FRENCH POLICY TOWARDS THE US ARE LIKELY IN THE SHORT TERM, GIVEN GISCARD'S PRAGMATISM, LONG-TERM CHANGES MAY BE IN THE OFFERING. YOUR MEETING WITH GISCARD WILL BE CONFIDENTIAL

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AN OPPORTUNITY TO ASSESS HIS THINKING VIS-A-VIS THE US AND A SIGN OF OUR INTEREST IN PUTTING OUR RELATIONS ON A BETTER FOOTING. GISCARD WILL HAVE ALREADY INTERPRETED PRESIDENT NIXON'S PROMPT (HE WAS THE FIRST FOR-

EIGN LEADER TO CALL GISCARD) AND PERSONAL CONGRATULATIONS, AND YOUR OWN MESSAGE AS WELL, AS INDICATIONS OF OUR INTEREST IN THIS REGARD. HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE HE WILL INITIALLY BE HESITANT ABOUT TAKING ACTIONS WHICH COULD BE INTERPRETED AS BEING TOO PRO-AMERICAN OR PRO-ATLANTIST BY THE GAULLISTS AND THE LEFT. CONSEQUENTLY, UNTIL GISCARD HAS GOTTEN ON TOP OF HIS CONSIDERABLE DOMESTIC PROBLEMS, INCLUDING THE GAULLISTS,

WE BELIEVE A LOW-KEY APPROACH IS IN OUR BEST INTERESTS.

2. IN ADDITION TO THE GENERAL SUBJECT OF OUR RELATIONS, WE EXPECT YOUR DISCUSSIONS TO FOCUS ON THE MATTER OF AN ATLANTIC DECLARATION AND THE MIDDLE EAST. WE MAY BEGIN OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH GISCARD'S ADMINISTRATION STILL AT ODDS OVER THE NATO DECLARATION. DE ROSE ON MAY 21 IN NATO, THOUGH SAYING HE WAS UNINSTRUCTED, COMPLAINED THAT THE BRITISH TEXT OMITTED SEVERAL KEY FORMULATIONS THAT WERE IN THE EARLIER FRENCH DRAFT. THE FRENCH DCM, IN A MEETING WITH HARTMAN THE NEXT DAY, MADE THE SAME POINT. IT ALSO REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHAT THEIR ATTITUDE WILL BE ON RE-OPENING DISCUSSION OF A US-EC DECLARATION. ON THE MIDDLE EAST, GISCARD HAS, AT LEAST IN HIS CAMPAIGN, SHOWN A MORE EVEN-HANDED APPROACH TOWARDS ISRAEL. PARTICULARLY NOTABLE WAS HIS REFERENCE TO THE "LEGITIMATE" ISRAELI DESIRE "NOT TO EXPOSE ITSELF TO A WEAKENING SETTLEMENT OF ITS BORDERS."

3. YOU WILL ARRIVE IN FRANCE THE DAY BEFORE GISCARD'S INAUGURATION. HE WILL BE IN THE MIDST OF CONSULTATIONS PREPARATORY TO THE FORMATION OF HIS GOVERNMENT, WHICH HE WILL ANNOUNCE MAY 27-28. GISCARD ENTERS OFFICE AS THE LEADER OF A LOOSELY ALLIED COALITION OF GAULLISTS, INDEPENDENT REPUBLICANS (THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY WHICH HE HEADS) AND CENTRISTS. HE HAS AN EXCEEDINGLY NARROW MANDATE (50.8 PERCENT). GISCARD'S RELATION-CONFIDENTIAL

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SHIP WITH THE GAULLISTS WILL BE A KEY TO THE SUCCESS OR FAILURE OF HIS ADMINISTRATION. THE GAULLISTS WERE HIS RELUCTANT SUPPORTS AGAINST MITTERRAND AND THE LEFT, BUT MANY OF THEM ARE NOT FOND OF GISCARD OR HIS POLICIES. GISCARD WILL NEED GAULLIST SUPPORT IN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY WHERE THEY HOLD A PLURALITY. THEY, IN TURN, WILL BE INCLINED TO SUPPORT HIM INITIALLY ON ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ISSUES IN VIEW OF THE ELECTORATE'S OBVIOUS DESIRE FOR CHANGE.

4. AFTER FORMING HIS GOVERNMENT, GISCARD'S KEY PRIORITY WILL BE TO INTRODUCE SHORT-TERM ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL MEASURES DESIGNED TO CURB INFLATION (CURRENT-

LY RUNNING AT AN ANNUAL RATE OF OVER 12 PERCENT AND SATISFY THE MINIMUM EXPECTATIONS OF THE ELECTORATE-- 49 PERCENT OF WHICH VOTED FOR MITTERRAND'S SWEEPING PROGRAM OF CHANGE. FOREIGN POLICY, AT LEAST INITIALLY, SHOULD PLAY A SECONDARY ROLE IN GISCARD'S ADMINISTRATION.

5. ISSUES AND TALKING POINTS:

6. US-FRENCH RELATIONS:

7. BACKGROUND:

8. SINCE EARLY 1973, THE FRENCH HAVE PURSUED THEIR NATIONAL INTERESTS IN A HARSH MANNER VIS-A-VIS THE UNITED STATES. THIS PERIOD COINCIDED WITH DOMESTIC PROBLEMS WHICH RESULTED IN A MORE STRIDENT NEO-GAULLISM AS WELL AS AN IMPORTANT FRENCH EFFORT TO DEVELOP AND LEAD A MORE CLOSELY KNIT EUROPEAN GROUPING, IN SEARCH OF WHAT HAS BEEN EUPHEMIZED AS THE "EUROPEAN IDENTITY." POMPIDOU APPEARS TO HAVE BELIEVED THAT THIS GOAL COULD BE REACHED ONLY BY ADOPTING A MORE DISTANT AND SOMETIMES HOSTILE STANCE TOWARD THE US.

9. WITH GISCARD'S ELECTION WE ANTICIPATE A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE TONE IN US-FRENCH RELATIONS. DRAMATIC SUBSTANTIVE CHANGES IN FRENCH POLICIES, PARTICULARLY TOWARD THE UNITED STATES, ARE NOT LIKELY IN THE SHORT TERM. GIVEN GISCARD'S PRAGMATISM, HOWEVER, LONGER TERM CHANGES MAY BE POSSIBLE AFTER HE HAS GOTTEN ON TOP OF HIS CONSIDERABLE DOMESTIC PROBLEMS.

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ERABLE DOMESTIC PROBLEMS.

10. FRENCH POSITION: RECENTLY, FRENCH POLICY HAS COLLIDED WITH THE US DESIRE FOR FORMALIZED ARRANGEMENTS FOR TRANSATLANTIC CONSULTATION AND COOPERATION. THE POMPIDOU ADMINISTRATION DID NOT ACCEPT THE PREMISE THAT THE WORLD ENERGY PROBLEM INCREASED THE NEED FOR SUCH COOPERATION ACROSS THE BOARD. NOR DID POMPIDOU ACCEPT THE VIEW THAT A SEPARATE EC APPROACH TO ARAB COUNTRIES ON ECONOMIC, FINANCIAL AND TECHNICAL RELATIONS WOULD INEVITABLY INVOLVE ENERGY QUESTIONS AS WELL AS POLITICAL ASPECTS OF A MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT.

11. DURING THE CAMPAIGN, GISCARD EXPRESSED FIRM OPPOSITION TO THE CONCEPT OF PRIOR CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN THE US AND THE EC. HE MAY, HOWEVER, ADOPT A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH REGARDING COOPERATION IN THE ENERGY FIELD AND IN THE MIDDLE EAST. HE IS REPORTED TO HAVE FAVORED PARTICIPATION IN THE ENERGY COORDINATING GROUP AND TO HAVE OPPOSED JOBERT'S POLICY OF STRIDENT BILATERALISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST. GISCARD'S ATTITUDES ON THESE MATTERS, AS WELL AS ON THE QUESTION OF THE EC AND NATO

DECLARATIONS AND ON AN EC-ARAB DIALOGUE, WILL BECOME CLEARER IN THE COMING WEEKS AND PARTICULARLY AFTER FRANCE ASSUMES THE EC COUNCIL PRESIDENCY ON JULY 1.

12. US POSITION: WE TRIED LAST YEAR OVER FRENCH OPPOSITION TO REDEFINE AND REINVIGORATE OUR RELATIONS WITH WESTERN EUROPE. MORE RECENTLY, WE HAVE SHARPENED THE FOCUS TO SECURE ARRANGEMENTS FOR TRANSATLANTIC CONSULTATION. WE SEEK AN OPPORTUNITY TO REGISTER OUR VIEWS AND RECEIVE A RESPONSE TO THEM BEFORE FINAL DECISIONS ARE TAKEN. WE ARE INTERESTED IN ACHIEVING A SUBSTANTIVELY SATISFACTORY NATO DECLARATION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

13. GISCARD'S ELECTION OFFERS A POSSIBILITY OF PUTTING US-FRENCH RELATIONS ON A BETTER FOOTING--THOUGH WE ARE NOT OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE SHORT-TERM PROSPECT OF DRAMATIC SUBSTANTIVE CHANGES IN FRENCH POLICY TOWARD THE US. WE HAVE PROBLEMS WHICH CANNOT BE OVERLOOKED BUT WE HOPE TO USE THIS CHANGE IN THE FRENCH PRESIDENCY TO RE-EMPHASIZE OUR COMMON INTERESTS AND COOPERATE CLOSELY AS EQUALS.

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14. TALKING POINTS:

15. IN DISCUSSIONS WITH FRENCH LEADERS WE SUGGEST YOU:

16. -- NOTE THAT WE HAVE HAD OUR PROBLEMS OVER THE PAST YEAR BUT THAT THE ADMINISTRATION, WHICH FROM THE OUTSET STRESSED ITS DESIRE TO DEAL WITH COMMON PROBLEMS IN A SPIRIT OF FRIENDSHIP, CONTINUES TO BELIEVE IN THIS COURSE.

17. -- STRESS THE COMMONALITY OF US-FRENCH INTERESTS AND OUR HOPE FOR CLOSE COOPERATION ON THE BASIS OF EQUALITY.

18. MIDDLE EAST:

19. FRENCH POSITION: WE ANTICIPATE UNDER GISCARD A CHANGE MORE OF TONE THAN OF SUBSTANCE IN FRENCH POLICY TOWARDS THE MIDDLE EAST. GISCARD MAY ADOPT A WARMER APPROACH TOWARDS ISRAEL--HE HAS TERMED LEGITIMATE, "ISRAEL'S DESIRE NOT TO EXPOSE ITSELF TO A WEAKENING SETTLEMENT OF ITS BORDERS." HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE HE GENERALLY ADHERES TO THE VIEW THAT FRENCH NATIONAL INTERESTS REQUIRE CONTINUED CLOSE RELATION WITH THE ARAB STATES. CONSEQUENTLY, THOUGH HE MAY DILUTE THEM SOMEWHAT, GISCARD CAN BE EXPECTED TO CONTINUE TRADITIONAL FRENCH POLICIES TOWARDS THE ISRAELIS AND ARABS--THOUGH IN A SOMEWHAT LESS STRIDENT MANNER THAN PREVIOUSLY.

IOUSLY. WITH REGARD TO YOUR EFFORTS TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT, THESE POLICIES INCLUDE: THE NECESSITY FOR INTERNATIONAL (READ FRENCH AND EUROPEAN) PARTICIPATION IN ANY FINAL SETTLEMENT; RESERVATIONS ABOUT ACHIEVING A "PIECEMEAL" SETTLEMENT; THE IMPORTANCE OF SETTLING THE PALESTINIAN (NATIONAL) PROBLEM AND OF FINDING AN ACCEPTABLE "INTERNATIONAL" STATUTE FOR JERUSALEM.

20. US POSITION: A PRINCIPAL TOPIC OF INTEREST TO
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GISCARD WILL BE THE MIDDLE EAST AND SPECIFICALLY YOUR EFFORTS TO PROMOTE DISENGAGEMENT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND SYRIA.

21. TALKING POINTS:

22. -- WE SUGGEST THAT YOU GIVE GISCARD AN ASSESSMENT OF YOUR MISSION AND OUTLINE OUR VIEWS ON THE MIDDLE EAST.

23. US-EC RELATIONS:

24. BACKGROUND:

25. AT THEIR GYMnich MEETING APRIL 20-21 THE EC FOREIGN MINISTERS AGREED INFORMALLY THAT ANY MEMBER COULD REQUEST A VOTE AT ANY TIME ON WHETHER TO HOLD CONSULTATIONS WITH THE US ON A SPECIFIC ISSUE. THEY REACHED A FURTHER CONSENSUS THAT ANY MEMBER COULD CONSULT BILATERALLY WITH THE UNITED STATES AT ANY TIME ON THE DEVELOPING POLICIES OF THE NINE.

26. FRENCH POSITION: JOBERT INFORMALLY JOINED IN THE GYMnich "COMPROMISE" CONSENSUS. GISCARD HAS SAID THAT HE REJECTS THE IDEA OF INSTITUTIONALIZED CONSULTATIONS AS FIRMLY AS DID POMPIDOU. WE BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT HE WILL BE MORE PRAGMATIC THAN HIS PREDECESSOR.

27. US POSITION: THE DISAPPOINTING EUROPEAN REACTION TO OUR PROPOSALS OVER THE LAST YEAR FOR REVITALIZING US-EUROPEAN RELATIONS HAS PROMPTED US TO SAY THAT THE EUROPEANS MUST MAKE THE NEXT MOVE. WE HAVE GIVEN THEM A PRELIMINARY INDICATION, HOWEVER, THAT WE VIEW THE INFORMAL CONSENSUS OF THE EC - 9 FOREIGN MINISTERS AS A POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTION TO AN ENHANCED DIALOGUE.

28. TALKING POINTS:

29. -- WE BELIEVE THAT THE GYMnich CONSENSUS OF THE NINE FOREIGN MINISTERS COULD BECOME A SIGNIFICANT STEP FORWARD,

ALTHOUGH WE WOULD PREFER LESS AD HOC ARRANGEMENTS. RUSH
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